This history of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is valuable if only for a widely-believed myth it manages to dispell. The myth is that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was part of a grand strategy to expand the Soviet empire and acquire a warm weather port. Braithwaite, using interviews with ex-Politburo members and records of Politburo meetings, shows conclusively that the Soviet leaders were very reluctant to prop up Kabul's communist government. Like the Americans in Vietnam, the Soviets felt forced into propping up an ideological allyor see them swept away. Their hope was that a few years of military support and training would allow the Afghans to rule and police their own country. Sound familiar?
After only a couple of years in Afghanistan the Russians, even those at the top of the political and military food chain, were aware that they were in a no-win situation. They could control the cities and some key highways but beyond that the country belonged to the mujahedin. And year after year it became more obvious that at some point the Soviets would have to cut their losses and leave. The problem was how to do this without appearing to abandon an ally. This conundrum lead to the war dragging on for several more years, all to no purpose except to further increase casualties on all sides.
Possibly a million Afghanis were killed during the war and millions more became refugees in neighbouring countries. A lot of the deaths were the result of feuds and power struggles between the differenct ethnic, religious and politcial groups that made up the mujahedin. One of the more shocking things revealed here is how badly the Soviet Army treated its soldiers. Rations were poor, pay virtually a joke, and, worst of all, basic healthcare was shockingly bad. The army suffered from major and constant outbreaks of hepatitis and cholera, both of which were due to slipshod management of water and sanitation. Medical treatment for wounded soldiers was rapid, but the overall quality of the medical care was terrible, mostly thanks to a shortage of medical supplies. And all this was on top of the daily physical hardships and brutality of life in the Soviet Army.
Braithwaite has a fascinating story to tell, but it has to be said that he's not much of a writer. He was the British ambassador in Moscow from 1988-92, and that has certainly provided him with some excellent sources, but too often his book reads like a briefing report. If you read this book follow it up with The 9/11 Wars by Jason Burke (my review here). Burke's book covers the post-9/11 war in Afghanistan, and it's an excellent overview of a complicated and controversial subject.
Showing posts with label Jason Burke. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jason Burke. Show all posts
Wednesday, May 30, 2012
Friday, January 13, 2012
Book Review: The 9/11 Wars (2011) by Jason Burke
Well, it's all here in one volume: the sad history of the various wars, insurgencies, riots, rebellions and terrorist campaigns that followed or stemmed from the attack on the World Trade Center towers. Jason Burke, a correspondent for the Guardian, gets full marks for a detailed and nuanced history of a fiendishly complicated subject. This is a history that covers events in Europe and America, as well as throughout the Islamic world, and the roll call of individuals, organizations, and groups is a long one.
Burke is at his best when he picks apart the 2003 invasion of Iraq and its bloody aftermath. He shows that the U.S. decision to invade and occupy Iraq with a minimal number of troops was a boneheaded decision that doomed the country to years of terrorism and sectarian warfare. Equally tragic were the American decisions to disband the Iraqi Army and remove Ba'ath Party members from government. Those two actions instantly created a huge pool of angry, impoverished Iraqis who were happy to take up arms against the invaders.
This book also makes it clear that al-Qaeda, as a terrorist group, is more of a concept than an actual organization. Islamic militants in places as far apart as Morocco and Indonesia come together and form al-Qaeda groups, as opposed to recruiters from al-Qaeda travelling the world setting up terror cells. Basically, many militants use the al-Qaeda title to indicate their purpose and goals, rather than an actual affiliation to a governing body.
The saddest aspect of Burke's history is that he reveals the futility of hoping for any kind of truly democratic governments to take root in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In all three countries tribal, clan, village and family loyalties and obligations take precedence over any kind of political organization. And a great many conservative Muslims, according to their interpretation of the Koran, view even the idea of government as anathema.
The only minor quibble I have is that Burke doesn't talk enough about the price Iraqi civilians have paid for the war. He says that up to 165,000 Iraqis were killed as a direct result of the invasion and its aftermath, but he doesn't detail the many more deaths, especially of children, that have occurred as result of Iraq's basic infrastructure falling apart. Disease, malnutrition, and contaminated water have probably killed as many Iraqis as have the bullets and bombs.
Burke is at his best when he picks apart the 2003 invasion of Iraq and its bloody aftermath. He shows that the U.S. decision to invade and occupy Iraq with a minimal number of troops was a boneheaded decision that doomed the country to years of terrorism and sectarian warfare. Equally tragic were the American decisions to disband the Iraqi Army and remove Ba'ath Party members from government. Those two actions instantly created a huge pool of angry, impoverished Iraqis who were happy to take up arms against the invaders.
This book also makes it clear that al-Qaeda, as a terrorist group, is more of a concept than an actual organization. Islamic militants in places as far apart as Morocco and Indonesia come together and form al-Qaeda groups, as opposed to recruiters from al-Qaeda travelling the world setting up terror cells. Basically, many militants use the al-Qaeda title to indicate their purpose and goals, rather than an actual affiliation to a governing body.
The saddest aspect of Burke's history is that he reveals the futility of hoping for any kind of truly democratic governments to take root in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In all three countries tribal, clan, village and family loyalties and obligations take precedence over any kind of political organization. And a great many conservative Muslims, according to their interpretation of the Koran, view even the idea of government as anathema.
The only minor quibble I have is that Burke doesn't talk enough about the price Iraqi civilians have paid for the war. He says that up to 165,000 Iraqis were killed as a direct result of the invasion and its aftermath, but he doesn't detail the many more deaths, especially of children, that have occurred as result of Iraq's basic infrastructure falling apart. Disease, malnutrition, and contaminated water have probably killed as many Iraqis as have the bullets and bombs.
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